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Cross Compliance: what about compliance?

Author

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  • Stefani, Gianluca
  • Giudicissi, Eufrasia

Abstract

We reviewed some moral hazard (MH) models applied to agri-environmental policies and identified the main methodological aspects of the literature on this topics. Imperfect vs incomplete monitoring , static vs dynamic and single vs multiple agents models are the main lines along which the literature has been organised analysing each component of a MH model. Most papers point out the role of farmers' risk aversion in mitigating MH. Others highlight that the observed high rate of compliance is still somewhat paradoxical given current enforcement strategies with low fines and monitoring levels. Cross compliance confirm these findings and urges further studies on dynamic models and farmers' non profit maximising behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefani, Gianluca & Giudicissi, Eufrasia, 2011. "Cross Compliance: what about compliance?," 122nd Seminar, February 17-18, 2011, Ancona, Italy 99597, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:eaa122:99597
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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99597
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ozanne, Adam & White, Benedict, 2003. "Agri-environment Policy Design With Hidden Information and Hidden Action: Input Quotas vs Input Charges," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 58196, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
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    Keywords

    Cross-compliance; Moral Hazard; Enforcement; Agri-environmental schemes; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q15; Q58; D82;

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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