Cross Compliance: what about compliance?
We reviewed some moral hazard (MH) models applied to agri-environmental policies and identified the main methodological aspects of the literature on this topics. Imperfect vs incomplete monitoring , static vs dynamic and single vs multiple agents models are the main lines along which the literature has been organised analysing each component of a MH model. Most papers point out the role of farmers' risk aversion in mitigating MH. Others highlight that the observed high rate of compliance is still somewhat paradoxical given current enforcement strategies with low fines and monitoring levels. Cross compliance confirm these findings and urges further studies on dynamic models and farmers' non profit maximising behaviour.
|Date of creation:||10 Feb 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.eaae.org|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ozanne, Adam & White, Benedict, 2003. "Agri-environment Policy Design With Hidden Information and Hidden Action: Input Quotas vs Input Charges," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 58196, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:eaa122:99597. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.