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Fiscal Policy as a Temptation Control Device


  • Chung Tran



We formulate an overlapping generations model with temptation and self-control preferences and incomplete market for commitment devices to study the role of two fiscal programs: social security and saving subsidy. In our environment, the distortions created by such fiscal programs work as a corrective tool that mitigates the adverse effect of succumbing to temptation on inter-temporal allocation and releases severity of self-control problem. Our results indicate that both fiscal programs potentially lead to welfare gains; however, the driving mechanisms are different. Welfare gains associated with a social security program result mainly from releasing self-control costs while welfare gains associated with a saving subsidy program are mainly driven by mitigating inter-temporal allocation distortion. In addition, we also find that the direction and size of welfare effects vary substantially when allowing for different tax-financing instruments as well as when accounting for general equilibrium price adjustments.

Suggested Citation

  • Chung Tran, 2012. "Fiscal Policy as a Temptation Control Device," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2012-595, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2012-595

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:nam:befdwp:9 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Emilie Bécault & Axel Marx, 2015. "International Climate Finance to developing countries. Taking stock of the variety of bilateral, private and hybrid financing initiatives," BeFinD Working Papers 0109, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    3. Tran, Chung, 2016. "Fiscal policy as a temptation control device: Savings subsidy and social security," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 254-268.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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