Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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• Liran Einav & Chiara Farronato & Jonathan Levin, , "Peer-to-Peer Markets," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, number 15-029.
• Noda, Shunya, 2019, "Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 1, January.
• Le, Phuong, 2018, "Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Tierney, Ryan, 2019, "On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 1, January.
• Ekmekci, Mehmet & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019, "Common enrollment in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2018, "Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 2, May.
• Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2020, "Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Janssen, Maarten & Kasberger, Bernhard, 2019, "On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke & Nichifor, Alexandru & Ostrovsky, Michael & Westkamp, Alexander, 2019, "Full substitutability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 14, issue 4, November.
• Baisa, Brian, 2020, "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2020, "Performance-maximizing large contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 1, January.
• Kloosterman, Andrew & Troyan, Peter, 2020, "School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 3, July.
• Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020, "Optimal dynamic matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 15, issue 3, July.
• Mackenzie, Andrew & Trudeau, Christian, 2023, "On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022, "When Walras meets Vickrey," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 4, November.
• Allman, Maxwell & Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin, 2023, "On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Margaria, Chiara, 2025, "Queueing to learn," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 2, May.
• Huang, Chao, 2023, "Stable matching: an integer programming approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 1, January.
• Manjunath, Vikram & Morrill, Thayer, 2023, "Interview hoarding," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 2, May.
• Liu, Ce, 2023, "Stability in repeated matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 4, November.
• Hopenhayn, Hugo & Saeedi, Maryam, 2023, "Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 4, November.
• Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2023, "Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 18, issue 3, July.
• Han, Xiang, 2024, "A theory of fair random allocation under priorities," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 3, July.
• Combe, Julien & Nora, Vladyslav & Tercieux, Olivier, 2025, "Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 1, January.
• Grigoryan, Aram, 0, "A continuum model as a limit of large finite matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Möller, Markus, 2026, "Transparent matching mechanisms," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 21, issue 1, January.
• Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling & Xu, Menghan, 2025, "Priority search with outside options," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 3, July.
• Carmona, Guilherme & Laohakunakorn, Krittanai, 2024, "Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 19, issue 3, July.
• Imamura, Kenzo & Kawase, Yasushi, 2025, "Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 20, issue 2, May.
• Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2026, "Choice or competition: does integration benefit everyone?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 21, issue 1, January.
• Moreno-García, Emma & Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo, 0, "Coalitional manipulability in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
• Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020, "Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-1145, Mar.
• Yoichi Kasajima & Manabu Toda, 2021, "Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems," Working Papers, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, number 2023-1, Mar.
• Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick & Waterson, Michael, 2019, "Organizing Competition for the Market," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 1188.
• Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, , "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 23/03.
• Jorgen Kratz, , "Conflicting Objectives in Kidney Exchange," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 23/04.
• Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, 2023, "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 23/05, Nov.

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