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WTO Exceptions as Insurance

In: Economic Effects of Antidumping

Author

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  • Ronald D. Fischer
  • Thomas J. Prusa

Abstract

The paper formalizes the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. The authors use a general-equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. It is shown that sector-specific contingent protection measures are superior to uniform contingent tariffs as an insurance mechanism. A tax-cum-subsidy policy (i.e., taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) also improves welfare and is superior to contingent protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald D. Fischer & Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "WTO Exceptions as Insurance," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 12, pages 259-271, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789811225253_0012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 25(1994 Micr), pages 51-118.
    2. Anne Krueger, 1995. "American Trade Policy: A Tragedy in the Making," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53526, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ronald Fischer & Martín Osorio, 2002. "Why Do We Need Antidumping Rules?," Documentos de Trabajo 134, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    2. Freund, Caroline & Ozden, Caglar, 2004. "Loss aversion and trade policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3385, The World Bank.
    3. Mr. Douglas A. Irwin, 2005. "The Rise of U.S. Antidumping Activity in Historical Perspective," IMF Working Papers 2005/031, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Phillip McCalman & Frank Stähler & Gerald Willmann, 2019. "Contingent trade policy and economic efficiency," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(2), pages 227-255, May.
    5. Meredith A. Crowley, 2006. "The agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures: tying one's hands through the WTO," Working Paper Series WP-06-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    6. Leonardo Baccini, 2010. "Explaining formation and design of EU trade agreements: The role of transparency and flexibility," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 195-217, June.
    7. Douglas Irwin, 2004. "The Rise of U.S. Antidumping Actions in Historical Perspective," NBER Working Papers 10582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Khatibi, Arastou, 2014. "The signaling power of trade protection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 226-228.
    9. Meredith A. Crowley, 2006. "Why are safeguards needed in a trade agreement?," Working Paper Series WP-06-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

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