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Francisco Silva

Personal Details

First Name:Francisco
Middle Name:
Last Name:Silva
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psi931
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://sites.google.com/site/franciscosilva2909/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Business School
Deakin University

Melbourne, Australia
http://www.deakin.edu.au/business/economics
RePEc:edi:sedeaau (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Nicolás Figueroa & José-Alberto Guerra & Francisco Silva, 2022. "The role of information in collective decisions," Documentos CEDE 20508, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
  2. Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
  3. Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  4. Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020. "Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation," Documentos de Trabajo 540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  5. Francisco Silva & Samir Mamadehussene, 2020. "The Equivalence Between Sequential and Simultaneous Firm Decisions," Documentos de Trabajo 541, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  6. Francisco Silva, 2016. "Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit?," Documentos de Trabajo 477, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  7. Francisco Silva, 2016. "Euthanasia: The Fear of Becoming a Burden," Documentos de Trabajo 478, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

Articles

  1. Samir Mamadehussene & Francisco Silva, 2023. "Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 192-211, March.
  2. Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
  3. Francisco Silva, 2023. "Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 720-737, July.
  4. Silva, Francisco, 2022. "The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 379-388.
  5. Rodrigo Harrison & Francisco Silva, 2020. "A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Voluntary Euthanasia And Physician Assisted Suicide," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(2), pages 745-763, April.
  6. Francisco Silva, 2020. "The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 99-113, November.
  7. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  8. Francisco Silva, 2019. "If We Confess Our Sins," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1389-1412, August.
  9. Francisco Silva, 2017. "Inducing Overconfidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 451-460, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0420, Department of Economics - dECON.

    Cited by:

    1. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023. "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).

  2. Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020. "Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation," Documentos de Trabajo 540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

    Cited by:

    1. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023. "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).

Articles

  1. Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Francisco Silva, 2020. "The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 99-113, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
    2. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.

  3. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.

    Cited by:

    1. Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
    2. Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020. "Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation," Documentos de Trabajo 540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

  4. Francisco Silva, 2019. "If We Confess Our Sins," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1389-1412, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    2. Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020. "Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation," Documentos de Trabajo 540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    3. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2017-04-09 2021-07-12 2021-07-12 2021-07-12 2022-05-02. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2021-07-12 2022-05-02. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2022-11-28
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2021-07-12
  5. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2022-11-28
  6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2021-07-12

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