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Social Choice and Legitimacy

Author

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  • Patty,John W.
  • Penn,Elizabeth Maggie

Abstract

Governing requires choices, and hence trade-offs between conflicting goals or criteria. This book asserts that legitimate governance requires explanations for such trade-offs and then demonstrates that such explanations can always be found, though not for every possible choice. In so doing, John W. Patty and Elizabeth Maggie Penn use the tools of social choice theory to provide a new and discriminating theory of legitimacy. In contrast with both earlier critics and defenders of social choice theory, Patty and Penn argue that the classic impossibility theorems of Arrow, Gibbard, and Satterthwaite are inescapably relevant to, and indeed justify, democratic institutions. Specifically, these institutions exist to do more than simply make policy - through their procedures and proceedings, these institutions make sense of the trade-offs required when controversial policy decisions must be made.

Suggested Citation

  • Patty,John W. & Penn,Elizabeth Maggie, 2014. "Social Choice and Legitimacy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521138338.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521138338
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Anesi & Mikhail Safronov, 2021. "Cloturing Deliberation," DEM Discussion Paper Series 21-03, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    2. Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2019. "Introduction to a special issue in honor of Kenneth Arrow," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 1-6, April.
    3. Sean Ingham, 2019. "Why Arrow’s theorem matters for political theory even if preference cycles never occur," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 97-111, April.
    4. IONESCU, Gabriela-Mariana, 2020. "Why The Minimal Wage Shouldn’T Be Established On The Minimum Consumption Basket?," Journal of Financial and Monetary Economics, Centre of Financial and Monetary Research "Victor Slavescu", vol. 8(1), pages 45-52, October.
    5. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Arrow’s decisive coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 463-505, March.
    6. Farrer, Benjamin & Holahan, Robert & Shvetsova, Olga, 2017. "Accounting for heterogeneous private risks in the provision of collective goods: Controversial compulsory contracting institutions in horizontal hydrofracturing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 138-150.
    7. Emil Dinga & Cristina Tănăsescu & Gabriela-Mariana Ionescu, 2022. "An Automatic Anchoring of the Reference Social Index," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 162(2), pages 935-957, July.
    8. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Axioms for defeat in democratic elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 475-524, October.
    9. Dougherty, Keith L. & Heckelman, Jac C., 2020. "The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    10. Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2015. "Arrow’s Theorem and its descendants," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 14, pages 237-262, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2019. "A defense of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 145-164, April.
    12. Sean Ingham, 2016. "Social choice and popular control," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(2), pages 331-349, April.

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