Commentary – Should Washington Have Pressed Kyiv Into A Compromise With Moscow?

This article was submitted in late 2021, and became dated after Russia's demonstrative preparation as well as start of an open, large‐scale invasion of Ukraine early 2022. We nevertheless publish this commentary here in order to document the debate about the events leading to the escalation. No adaptations to the original 2021 article were made after the outbreak of high‐intensity war on 24 February 2022. Avoiding a larger military escalation in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict is an important aim. Yet, historical experience suggests that concessions by Ukraine or its Western partners toward Russian revanchist aspirations in the Donbas may not help achieve it. On the contrary, Western softness, and Ukrainian weakness vis‐à‐vis the Kremlin will lead to further confrontation. Si bien evitar una escalada militar mayor es un objetivo importante, la experiencia histórica sugiere que las concesiones de Ucrania o sus socios occidentales hacia las aspiraciones revanchistas rusas en el Donbass pueden no ayudar a lograrlo. Por el contrario, la blandura occidental y la debilidad de Ucrania frente al Kremlin conducirán a una mayor confrontación. 尽管避免更大的军事升级是一项重要目标, 但历史经验暗示, 乌克兰或其西方伙伴在顿巴斯对俄罗斯的复仇野心所作的妥协可能不会实现这一目标。相反, 与克里姆林宫相比, 西方的软弱性和乌克兰的劣势将导致进一步对峙。