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On the core and competitive equilibria of a market with indivisible goods

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  • Mamoru Kaneko

Abstract

We consider a generalization of the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [4]. In the market which we consider, s kinds of indivisible goods are exchanged for money. The market consists of buyers and sellers. Each buyer wants to buy at most one unit of the goods, and each seller may sell more than one unit. First, we show that the set of all competitive imputations is given by the solutions of a certain linear programing problem dual to the optimal problem. Second, we show that the core of the market coincides with the set of all competitive imputations under some condition, and consider the core of the market where s=1 and the condition does not hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Mamoru Kaneko, 1976. "On the core and competitive equilibria of a market with indivisible goods," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(2), pages 321-337, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:navlog:v:23:y:1976:i:2:p:321-337
    DOI: 10.1002/nav.3800230214
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Bichler & Johannes Knörr & Felipe Maldonado, 2023. "Pricing in Nonconvex Markets: How to Price Electricity in the Presence of Demand Response," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(2), pages 652-675, June.
    2. Streekstra, Leanne & Trudeau, Christian, 2020. "Stable source connection and assignment problems as multi-period shortest path problems," Discussion Papers on Economics 7/2020, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    3. Mete Şeref Ahunbay & Martin Bichler & Johannes Knörr, 2024. "Challenges in Designing Electricity Spot Markets," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Ata Atay & Marina N'u~nez & Tam'as Solymosi, 2024. "A many-to-one job market: more about the core and the competitive salaries," Papers 2404.04847, arXiv.org.
    5. Gerard Domènech Gironell & Marina Núñez Oliva, 2022. "Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/419, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    6. Domènech, Gerard & Núñez, Marina, 2022. "Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 469-484.
    7. R. Branzei & E. Gutiérrez & N. Llorca & J. Sánchez-Soriano, 2021. "Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 17-40, June.
    8. Martin C. Byford, 2018. "Ex-post price stability with convex costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1065-1085, November.

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