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An experimental test of behavior under team production

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  • Donald Vandegrift
  • Abdullah Yavas

Abstract

This study reports experiments that examine behavior under team production and a piece rate. In the experiments, participants complete a forecasting task and are rewarded based on the accuracy of their forecasts. In the piece-rate condition, participants are paid based on their own performance, whereas the team‐production condition rewards participants based on the average performance of the team. Overall, there is no statistically significant difference in performance between the conditions. However, this result masks important differences in the behavior of men and women across the conditions. Men in the team‐production condition increase their performance relative to men in the piece‐rate condition. However, this gap in male performances across conditions diminishes over the course of the experiment. In contrast, women in the team‐production condition show significantly lower performance than the women in the piece rate. As a consequence of these differences, men in the team‐production condition show significantly better performance than women in the team‐production condition. We also find evidence that men show stronger performance when they are in teams with a larger variation in skill level. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald Vandegrift & Abdullah Yavas, 2011. "An experimental test of behavior under team production," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(1), pages 35-51, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:1:p:35-51
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1516
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    Cited by:

    1. Vanessa Mertins & Wolfgang Hoffeld, 2015. "Do Overconfident Workers Cooperate Less? The Relationship Between Overconfidence and Cooperation in Team Production," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(4), pages 265-274, June.
    2. Kräkel, Matthias & Nieken, Petra, 2015. "Relative performance pay in the shadow of crisis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 244-268.
    3. Gjedrem, William Gilje & Kvaløy, Ola, 2020. "Relative performance feedback to teams," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    4. Chao, Hong & Croson, Rachel T.A., 2013. "An experimental comparison of incentive contracts in partnerships," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 78-87.
    5. Chung, A., 2024. "Target Setting in Contests with Sabotage," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2409, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Bartke, Simon & Gelhaar, Felix, 2018. "When does team remuneration work? An experimental study on interactions between workplace contexts," Kiel Working Papers 2105, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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