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Incentives And The Cost Of Firing In An Equilibrium Labor Market Model With Endogenous Layoffs

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  • Cheng Wang

Abstract

I study the effects of firing costs in an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard. Layoff is an incentive device, modeled as termination of the optimal long‐term contract. When the economy’s stock of firms is fixed, firing costs could reduce layoffs and increase worker welfare. In the long run when firms are free to enter and exit the market, firing costs generate not only lower employment, longer unemployment durations, and lower aggregate output, but also lower welfare for both employed workers and new labor market entrants.

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  • Cheng Wang, 2013. "Incentives And The Cost Of Firing In An Equilibrium Labor Market Model With Endogenous Layoffs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(2), pages 443-472, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:54:y:2013:i:2:p:443-472
    DOI: iere.12002
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    1. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2015. "Equilibrium matching and termination," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 208-229.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yunan Li & Cheng Wang, 2022. "Endogenous Labor Market Cycles," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 849-881, May.
    2. Jonathan Créchet, 2023. "Risk Sharing in a Dual Labor Market," Working Papers 2307E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    3. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2015. "Equilibrium matching and termination," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 208-229.

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