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Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycles: theory and some evidence

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  • Jac C. Heckelman

Abstract

The Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycle model is developed, where agents face uncertainty regarding the timing and outcome of the next election. The model predicts that partisan influences on the economy persist throughout the government’s rule and are further influenced, in the opposite direction, by which party ruled in the previous period. Party popularity also has a causal effect on the business cycle. Finally, the effects from changes in election timing expectations are dependent on which party ruled in the previous period. Empirical results for output and unemployment in Canada, Germany, and United Kingdom yield mixed support for the model. JEL Classification: D72, E32 Le modèle des cycles d’affaires variables fondé sur le comportement du partisan rationnel : théorie et résultats. Le modèle de cycles d’affaires variables fondé sur le comportement du partisan rationnel est développé pour le cas où les agents font face à de l’incertitude quant au moment du déclenchement des élections et quant aux résultats des prochaines élections. Le modèle prédit que les influences partisanes sur l’économie persistent tout au long du mandat du gouvernement, et qu’elles sont influencées, dans la direction opposée, par le type de parti au pouvoir au cours du mandat antérieur. La popularité du parti a un effet de causalité sur le cycle d’affaires. Enfin les effets des changements dans les anticipations du moment du déclenchement des élections dépendent de quel parti était au pouvoir au cours de la période antérieure. Les résultats empiriques de la calibration du modèle pour la production et le chômage au Canada,en Allemagne et au Royaume Uni donnent des résultats mitigés.

Suggested Citation

  • Jac C. Heckelman, 2002. "Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycles: theory and some evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(3), pages 568-585, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:35:y:2002:i:3:p:568-585
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5982.00146
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    Cited by:

    1. Niklas Potrafke, 2011. "Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 101-134, June.
    2. Berlemann, Michael & Markwardt, Gunther, 2006. "Variable rational partisan cycles and electoral uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 874-886, December.
    3. Michael Berlemann & Gunther Markwardt, 2007. "Unemployment and Inflation Consequences of Unexpected Election Results," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(8), pages 1919-1945, December.
    4. Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 155-179, January.
    5. Chrétien, Stéphane & Coggins, Frank, 2009. "Election outcomes and financial market returns in Canada," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-23, March.
    6. Cameron Shelton, 2012. "The information content of elections and varieties of the partisan political business cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 209-240, January.
    7. Mechtel, Mario & Potrafke, Niklas, 2009. "Political Cycles in Active Labor Market Policies," MPRA Paper 14270, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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