The Implicit Pension Contract: Developments and New Directions
Pension economics has emerged as a separate literature over the past decade. Some of the early pension work was devoted to financial issues, including implications of pensions for savings rates and portfolio allocation. Most new developments, however, have stemmed from research surrounding labor markets. This research has led to an implicit contract theory of pensions, a theory that has pensions playing a more complicated role in worker-firm relation than heretofore realized. The theory explains much of economic behavior in labor markets, and bridges a gap between labor and financial literatures. This essay describes the genesis for these ideas and traces some of the most important research results in the area. An equal amount of spece is devoted to a consideration of likely directions for future research.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:22:y:1987:i:3:p:441-467. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.