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A Model of Dynamic Limit Pricing with an Application to the Airline Industry

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  • Andrew Sweeting
  • James W. Roberts
  • Chris Gedge

Abstract

We develop a dynamic limit pricing model where an incumbent repeatedly signals information relevant to a potential entrant’s expected profitability. The model is tractable, with a unique equilibrium under refinement, and dynamics contribute to large equilibrium price changes. We show that the model can explain why incumbent airlines cut prices dramatically on routes threatened with entry by Southwest, presenting new reduced-form evidence and a calibration that predicts a pattern of price changes across markets similar to the one observed in the data. We use our calibrated model to quantify the welfare effects of asymmetric information and subsidies designed to encourage Southwest’s entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Sweeting & James W. Roberts & Chris Gedge, 2020. "A Model of Dynamic Limit Pricing with an Application to the Airline Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 1148-1193.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/704760
    DOI: 10.1086/704760
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    Cited by:

    1. Vaziri, M., 2022. "Antitrust Law and Business Dynamism," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2243, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Ali Hortacsu & Olivia R. Natan & Hayden Parsley & Timothy Schwieg & Kevin R. Williams, 2021. "Organizational Structure and Pricing: Evidence from a Large U.S. Airline," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2312R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2022.
    3. Miguel Ángel Ropero, 2021. "Entry deterrence when the potential entrant is your competitor in a different market," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(3), pages 1010-1030, January.
    4. Victor Aguirregabiria & Allan Collard-Wexler & Stephen P. Ryan, 2021. "Dynamic Games in Empirical Industrial Organization," NBER Working Papers 29291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Bet, Germán, 2021. "Product specification under a threat of entry: Evidence from Airlines’ departure times," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    6. Bauner, Christoph & Liu, Zexuan, 2022. "Incumbents’ pricing and nonpricing responses to entry in vertically differentiated markets," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    7. Joseph Hickey, 2023. "Simple model of market share dynamics based on clients' firm-switching decisions," Papers 2304.08727, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    8. Hickey, Joseph, 2024. "Simple model of market share dynamics based on clients’ firm-switching decisions," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 635(C).
    9. Ristić Bojan & Trifunović Dejan & Herceg Tomislav, 2021. "Capacity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies: Entry Deterrence with Alternative Objective Functions," South East European Journal of Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 16(1), pages 84-92, June.
    10. Kerkemezos, Yannis & Pennings, Enrico & Karreman, Bas & van Reeven, Peran, 2023. "Price asymmetries and the path dependence of market power: Evidence from the U.S. airline industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    11. Aniko …ry & Ali Horta su & Kevin Williams, 2022. "Dynamic Price Competition: Theory and Evidence from Airline Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2341R1, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2023.
    12. Cesaltina Pacheco Pires & Margarida Catalão‐Lopes, 2020. "Does asymmetric information always help entry deterrence? Can it increase welfare?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 686-705, July.
    13. Gopal Varma & Martino Stefano, 2022. "Entry Deterrence, Concentration, and Merger Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(2), pages 199-222, September.

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