IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jnlbus/v79y2006i6p2911-2924.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Prevention Is Better than Cure: The Role of IPO Syndicates in Precluding Information Acquisition

Author

Listed:
  • Yoram Barzel

    (University of Washington)

Abstract

We treat information acquisition by potential investors in initial public offerings as endogenous. With endogenous information, the critical question is why underwriters would allow investors to spend resources acquiring superior information intended solely to effect a wealth transfer. We show that an investment banking syndicate is an institutional arrangement designed to avoid such a transfer. By inviting rival banks to share in the offering, a managing underwriter ensures they have a strong incentive to remain ignorant. We characterize the resulting outcome as one of symmetric ignorance. The desire to maintain symmetric ignorance is consistent with the observed passivity of nonmanaging syndicate participants.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoram Barzel, 2006. "Prevention Is Better than Cure: The Role of IPO Syndicates in Precluding Information Acquisition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(6), pages 2911-2924, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:79:y:2006:i:6:p:2911-2924
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/508003
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Satyendra Kumar Sharma & Ankit Seraphim, 2010. "The Relationship between IPO Underpricing Phenomenon & the Underwriter’s Reputation," Romanian Economic Journal, Department of International Business and Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest, vol. 13(38), pages 181-209, December.
    2. Habib, Michel Antoine, 2015. "Multifaceted Transactions, Incentives, and Organizational Form," CEPR Discussion Papers 10432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:79:y:2006:i:6:p:2911-2924. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.