Aircraft Noise Regulation, Airline Service Quality, and Social Welfare: the Monopoly Case
This paper develops a simple theoretical model to analyse the effects of noise regulation on a monopoly airline's flight frequency, traffic volume, and aircraft 'quietness' choices. Two types of noise limit are considered: a cumulative limit on total noise at an airport and a limit on noise per aircraft operation. Tighter noise limits, which reduce community exposure to noise, cause airlines to reduce flight frequency and traffic served, thus hurting consumers. A welfare analysis explores socially optimal noise regulation, taking into account the social cost of noise damage along with consumer surplus and airline profit. © 2010 LSE and the University of Bath
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:44:y:2010:i:1:p:17-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.