Yardstick Competition in Toll Revenues: Evidence from US States
States have competed against one another in a variety of fiscal venues. We demonstrate that toll revenues are another such arena, with states competing with those states from which they receive and/or send many commuters. Because the size of interstate commuters is small relative to intrastate commuters, and because commuters exhibit inelastic behaviour with regard to toll changes, we argue that competition over tolls is an example of political-based yardstick competition. © 2009 LSE and the University of Bath
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