An Experimental Comparison of Track Allocation Mechanisms in the Railway Industry
The capacity of railway tracks is a scarce commodity that is, by nature, more complex than many other commodities. This paper presents results from a series of economic testbed experiments on the performance of different auctioning mechanisms for allocating track capacity between competing users. The auction mechanism will not only decide the price, it also serves to define the commodities (the particular departure-arrival time slots) demanded, and selects which of these are sold. Four combinations of pricing and stopping rules are compared. Realised allocations are very efficient for all four combinations and also generate approximately equal revenue. The research provides input for the process of re-regulating an industry undergoing profound institutional change. © The London School of Economics and the University of Bath 2003
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:37:y:2003:i:3:p:353-381. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.