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Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games

Author

Listed:
  • Carmona, Guilherme

    (School of Economics, University of Surrey)

  • Podczeck, Konrad

    (Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Wien)

Abstract

In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players) we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2021. "Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:3967
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    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Bin, 2022. "On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 305-315.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Large games; pure strategy; Nash equilibrium; generic property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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