IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/rjerxx/v14y1997i1p65-75.html

Adversarial Brokerage in Residential Real Estate Transactions: The Impact of Separate Buyer Representation

Author

Listed:
  • Vickie Bajtelsmit
  • Elaine Worzala

Abstract

Although substantial research effort has been directed to the examination of optimal search and pricing behavior under traditional brokerage arrangements, market outcomes under conditions of undisclosed subagency and buyer representation have not been fully explored. This study applies the legal and economic theory of agency to real estate markets with cooperating brokers. The existence of cooperating brokers acting as subagents of the seller with the buyer’s full knowledge does not change the buyer’s and seller’s net payoffs relative to the single-agent case. However, when the buyer mistakenly believes that the cooperating broker/subagent is acting as his agent in negotiations, there may be informational gains that result in a higher selling price and a higher payoff to the seller at the expense of the buyer. The analysis indicates that buyer brokers may be a potential solution to this agency problem. When both parties to a real estate transaction have separate representation, their net payoffs are shown to be higher and the sales price lower than under traditional brokerage arrangements. The result is dependent on several factors, including: market conditions, relative bargaining power of the parties, method of broker compensation, and disclosure of the status of the buyer broker.

Suggested Citation

  • Vickie Bajtelsmit & Elaine Worzala, 1997. "Adversarial Brokerage in Residential Real Estate Transactions: The Impact of Separate Buyer Representation," Journal of Real Estate Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 65-75, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rjerxx:v:14:y:1997:i:1:p:65-75
    DOI: 10.1080/10835547.1997.12090887
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10835547.1997.12090887
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/10835547.1997.12090887?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. J’Noel Gardiner & Jeffrey Heisler & Jarl Kallberg & Crocker Liu, 2007. "The Impact of Dual Agency," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 39-55, July.
    3. Marcus T. Allen & Justin D. Benefield & Ronald C. Rutherford, 2023. "Co-Listing Strategies: Better Transaction Outcomes?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 517-544, October.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/515 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Larceneux, Fabrice & Lefebvre, Thomas & Simon, Arnaud, 2015. "What added value do estate agents offer compared to FSBO transactions? Explanation from a perceived advantages model," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 72-82.
    6. Jonathan A. Wiley & Len V. Zumpano, 2008. "The Real Estate Brokerage Market and the Decision to Disclose Property Condition Defects," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 693-716, December.
    7. Natalya Delcoure & Norm G. Miller, 2001. "The Future of the US Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry in Light of the Internet and International Indications," ERES eres2001_147, European Real Estate Society (ERES).
    8. Fabrice Larceneux & Thomas Lefebvre & Arnaud Simon, 2015. "What added value do Estate Agents offer compared to FSBO transaction? Explanation from a perceived advantages model," Post-Print hal-01635048, HAL.
    9. Fabrice Larceneux & Thomas Lefebvre, 2016. "The " Bad Deal " Illusion," Post-Print halshs-01671084, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:rjerxx:v:14:y:1997:i:1:p:65-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/rjer20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.