The 1994 currency crisis in Turkey
This paper analyzes the 1994 crisis in Turkey. The period preceding the crisis witnessed a continuous deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals. However, domestic debt financing of public deficits prevented reserve losses and an increase in inflation rate. It is argued that despite weak fundamentals of the period preceding the crisis, in the absence of policy “mistakes” that played a role of a series of shocks in the second half of 1993, the financial crisis could have been avoided.
Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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