Regulatory conflict in the Chicago VOC control program
The study analyzes the performance of an innovative cap-and-trade program designed to make cost-effective reductions of an ozone precursor in Chicago and finds that decentralized market incentives were undermined by the continuance of centralized traditional emission point or command-and-control regulation. The study makes two contributions for urban areas considering this regulatory measure: it shows that using two regulatory measures to achieve one emissions reduction goal can undercut cost-effective emissions trading, and it provides a redesign of the market system that coordinates both regulatory measures for cost-effective control and avoidance of trading problems, such as hot spots and inter-temporal spikes.
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Volume (Year): 51 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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