Is Delegating Half of Demand Management Sensible?
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- Rankin, Neil, 1995. "Is Delegating Half of Demand Management Sensible?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 443, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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- Gartner, Manfred, 2000. " Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 527-561, December.
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"Central Banks, Trade Unions and Reputation – Is there Room for an Expansionist Manoeuvre in the European Union?,"
19719, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pusch, Toralf & Heise, Arne, 2008. "Central banks, trade unions and reputation - is there room for an expansionist manoeuvre in the European Union?," Working Papers on Economic Governance 31, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
- Maria Demertzis & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Nicola Viegi, 1999. "Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 217-240, September.
More about this item
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
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