The association between disclosure level and information quality: voluntary management earnings forecasts
This study investigates the empirical association between managers information advantages and disclosure quality choice in the context of management earnings forecasts (MEF). The main hypothesis is that the quality of information available to managers is associated with cross-sectional differences in firm characteristics, and that managers information advantages determine four classes of forecast pattern: no disclosure, qualitative disclosure (open-ended interval estimate or general impression), range (close-interval estimate) forecasts and point estimate. Prior works were extended through utilization of a multi-level forecast precision model, and through comparison of selected firm characteristics in forecast years with non-forecast years. The major findings of this study are as follows. First, the results support the notion that managers are likely to select low-level disclosure precision as the magnitude of earnings volatility increases. Second, the findings indicate that the proportion of outside ownership is significantly associated with high-level forecast precision. Lastly, the results indicate the dispersion of analysts forecasts (before the MEF) is larger in the year of the MEF than in a non-forecast year. A discussion of the implications of these results is provided.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2003)
Issue (Month): 9 ()
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