Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics
Although the uncovered set has occupied a prominent role in social choice theory, its exact shape has never been determined in a general setting. This paper calculates the uncovered set when actors have pork barrel, or purely distributive, preferences, and shows that in this setting nearly the entire Pareto set is uncovered. The result casts doubt on the usefulness of the uncovered set as a general solution concept and suggests that to predict the distribution of political benefits one must explicitly model the institutions that structure collective choice.
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Volume (Year): 15 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 29 April 1993/Accepted: 28 June 1996|
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