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Entscheidungswirkungen steuerlicher Erfolgsabgrenzungsparadigmen bei multinationalen Unternehmen

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  • André Schröer

    (Universität Mannheim)

Abstract

Summary In general, the allocation of income of multinational enterprises to several jurisdictions for corporate tax purposes follows the OECD standard of the arm’s length principle. In contrast to the theory of the multinational enterprise, delimitation of income following this principle does not fit systematically to the theoretical perception of the multinational enterprise as an integrated business. It is shown that almost any transfer price for tax purposes except for marginal-cost prices affects the optimal production plan. Therefore, it is inadequate to fix arm’s length related transfer pricing schemes to value cross border activities for tax purposes. Since the EU-Commission favours a comprehensive approach which is based on the unitary principle to tax integrated businesses in Europe, conditions under which an efficient allocation of resources results are specified.

Suggested Citation

  • André Schröer, 2004. "Entscheidungswirkungen steuerlicher Erfolgsabgrenzungsparadigmen bei multinationalen Unternehmen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 259-281, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:56:y:2004:i:3:d:10.1007_bf03372737
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372737
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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