Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions with Costly Information," Microeconomics 0211012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Xavier Vives, 2014.
"On The Possibility Of Informationally Efficient Markets,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
European Economic Association, vol. 12(5), pages 1200-1239, October.
- Vives, Xavier, 2014. "On the Possibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," IESE Research Papers D/1104, IESE Business School.
- García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005.
"Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Xianwen Shi & Juuso Valimaki, 2009.
"Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Actions,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 61-89, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki & Xianwen Shi, 2007. "Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000320, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Xianwen Shi & Juuso Valimaki, 2007. "Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1619, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Shi, Xianwen & Valimaki, Juuso, 2007. "Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions," Working Papers 25, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Xianwen Shi & Juuso Valimaki, 2008. "Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-307, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
- repec:eee:jeeman:v:85:y:2017:i:c:p:130-145 is not listed on IDEAS
- Braz Camargo & Kyungmin Kim & Benjamin Lester, 2016.
"Information Spillovers, Gains from Trade, and Interventions in Frozen Markets,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(5), pages 1291-1329.
- Camargo, Braz & Kim, Kyungmin & Lester, Benjamin, 2016. "Information Spillovers, Gains From Trade, And Interventions In Frozen Markets," Working Papers 16-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Tunca, Tunay I., 2008. "Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(9-10), pages 964-996, September.
- Diego García & Branko Urosevic, 2004. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Economics Working Papers 785, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
More about this item
KeywordsAuctions; efficiency; information acquisition; information aggregation;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:121-141. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.