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Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form

  • Amnon Rapoport

    (Department of Management and Policy, McClelland Hall 405, University of Arizona, Tuscon, AZ 85721, USA)

"Can we find a pair of extensive form games that give rise to the same strategic form game such that, when played by a reasonable subject population, there is a statistically significant difference in how the games are played?" (Kreps, 1990, p. 112). And if yes, "can we organize these significant differences according to some principles that reflect recognizable differences in the extensive forms?" Both questions are answered positively by reporting results from three different experiments on public goods provision, resource dilemmas, and pure coordination games.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 26 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 113-136

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:113-136
Note: Received March 1994 Revised version April 1995
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