Core, Value and Equilibria for Market Games: On a Problem of Aumann and Shapley
In this note a partial solution of Open Problem 41C of Aumann and Shapley (1974) is presented. A sufficient condition for the Aumann-Shapley value of a market game to exist, to be contained in its core, and to be the competitive payoff distribution of a transferable utility competitive equilibrium is given. In this context, balancedness and theta-balancedness criteria for large classes of cooperative games are proven.
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Volume (Year): 25 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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