Existence Theorems of Nash Equilibria for Non-cooperative N-Person Games
In this paper, we first obtain existence theorems of Nash equilibria for non-cooperative "n"- person games which generalize a corresponding result of Nikaido and Isoda (1955). As applications, we give two new existence theorems of [epsilon]-equilibrium points which generalize that of Tijs (1981). Finally, a saddle point theorem of Komiya (1986) is deduced from one of our existence theorems of [epsilon]-equilibrium points.
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Volume (Year): 24 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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