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Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection

  • Meglena Jeleva

    ()

  • Bertrand Villeneuve

    ()

This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-003-0396-x
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 23 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
Pages: 777-794

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:23:y:2004:i:4:p:777-794
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  1. Bertrand Villeneuve, 2000. "The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(1), pages 65-79, June.
  2. Landsberger Michael & Meilijson Isaac, 1994. "Monopoly Insurance under Adverse Selection When Agents Differ in Risk Aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 392-407, August.
  3. Michael Landsberger & Isaac Meilijson, 1999. "A general model of insurance under adverse selection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 331-352.
  4. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  5. David Schmeidler, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7662, David K. Levine.
  6. Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December.
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