Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
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- Meglena Jeleva & Bertrand Villeneuve, 1997. "Insurance Contracts with Imprecise Probabilities and Adverse Selection," Working Papers 97-16, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
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- Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015.
"Pessimistic information gathering,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
- Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Post-Print halshs-01156552, HAL.
- Anwar, Sajid & Zheng, Mingli, 2012. "Competitive insurance market in the presence of ambiguity," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 79-84.
- Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
- repec:spr:joecth:v:65:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1035-2 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018. "Price discrimination with loss averse consumers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 681-728, May.
- Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model," MPRA Paper 37630, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
- Mario Ghossoub, 2016. "Optimal Insurance with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Disagreement about Zero-Probability Events," Risks, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 1-28, August.
- Kostas Koufopoulos & Roman Kozhan, 2016. "Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 659-687, October.
- Mouhamadou Fall, 2012. "Fiabilité des tests génétiques et architecture des contrats d'équilibre," Working Papers halshs-00751861, HAL.
- Rajeev K. Goel, 2006. "Insurance intermediaries and contractual relations," Applied Financial Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 2(4), pages 211-215, July.
- Sandroni, Alvaro & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Overconfidence and asymmetric information: The case of insurance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 149-165.
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
- Giuseppe, DE FEO & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2005. "Efficiency of Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- DE FEO, Giuseppe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2005. "Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection," CORE Discussion Papers 2005054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Arthur Snow, 2015. "Monopolistic Insurance and the Value of Information," Risks, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(3), pages 1-13, July.
- : Kostas Koufopoulos & : Roman Kozhan, 2012. "Optimal Insurance under Advserse Selection and Ambiguity Aversion," Working Papers wpn12-07, Warwick Business School, Finance Group.
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
- Emir Kamenica & Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard Thaler, 2011. "Helping Consumers Know Themselves," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 417-422, May.
- Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mingli Zheng & Chong Wang & Chaozheng Li, 2016. "Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection When the Insurer Has Ambiguity about the Composition of the Consumers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 17(1), pages 179-206, May.
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KeywordsImprecise probabilities; Insurance markets; Adverse selection.;
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