Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
In each stage of a repeated game with private monitoring, the players receive payoffs and privately observe signals which depend on the players' actions and the state of world. I show that, contrary to a widely held belief, such games admit a recursive structure. More precisely, I construct a representation of the original sequential problem as a sequence of static games with incomplete information. This establishes the ground for a characterization of strategies and, hence, of behavior in interactive-decision settings where private information is present. Finally, the representation is used to give a recursive characterization of the equilibrium payoff set, by means of a multi-player generalization of dynamic programming. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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Volume (Year): 22 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (09)
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