Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition
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- Faulí-Oller, Ramon & Ok, Efe A & Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio, 2001. "Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Zakharov Alexei, 2005. "Candidate location and endogenous valence," EERC Working Paper Series 05-17e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
- Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013.
"The efficacy and efforts of interest groups in post elections policy formation,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 77-105, February.
- Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012. "The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4009, CESifo Group Munich.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2012. "The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 7031, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Amal Sanyal & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Reputation, Cheap Talk and Delegation," Game Theory and Information 0501001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andrei M. Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2016.
"Endogenous party platforms: ‘stochastic’ membership,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 839-866, October.
- Andrei Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2013. "Endogenous party platforms; "Stochastic" Membership," Working Papers 1307, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Wolitzky, Alexander, 2013. "Endogenous institutions and political extremism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 86-100.
More about this item
KeywordsKeywords and Phrases:Delegation; Political competition; Polarization.; JEL Classification Numbers:D72.;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
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