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A remark on discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity

Author

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  • Wei He

    (The University of Iowa)

  • Nicholas C. Yannelis

    (The University of Iowa)

Abstract

We consider discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity (i.e., players have maximin preferences à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). It is shown that the existence of equilibria follows directly from the existence of Nash equilibria in every ex post game if all players are endowed with the maximin preferences. This is false for discontinuous games where players have Bayesian preferences as shown in He and Yannelis (2015a).

Suggested Citation

  • Wei He & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2017. "A remark on discontinuous games with asymmetric information and ambiguity," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 119-126, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:5:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-016-0100-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0100-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pavlo Prokopovych, 2016. "Majorized correspondences and equilibrium existence in discontinuous games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 541-552, March.
    2. János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2016. "Subgame-perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 479-495, March.
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    6. Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2016. "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 515-540, March.
    7. Guilherme Carmona & Konrad Podczeck, 2016. "Existence of Nash equilibrium in ordinal games with discontinuous preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 457-478, March.
    8. Vincenzo Scalzo, 2016. "Remarks on the existence and stability of some relaxed Nash equilibrium in strategic form games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 571-586, March.
    9. Luciano Castro & Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas Yannelis, 2011. "Core and equilibria under ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 519-548, October.
    10. Guilherme Carmona, 2016. "Reducible equilibrium properties: comments on recent existence results," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 431-455, March.
    11. Angelos Angelopoulos & Leonidas Koutsougeras, 2015. "Value allocation under ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 147-167, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. R. R. Routledge & R. A. Edwards, 2020. "Ambiguity and price competition," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(2), pages 231-256, March.
    2. Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2019. "On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    3. Bernard Cornet, 2020. "The Gale–Nikaido–Debreu lemma with discontinuous excess demand," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 169-180, October.

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