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Minimum taxation as a luxury good

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  • Maurizio Caserta
  • Francesco Reito

Abstract

This paper investigates the use of minimum tax thresholds to avoid income tax evasion. We analyze a moral-hazard model in which, given the endogenous audit probability, taxpayers may choose to comply or not with their tax obligation. The main result is that the imposition of a minimum tax, whereby taxpayers need to pay a tax on wealth no lower than a certain amount, can be Pareto efficient. The result hinges upon a critical level of wealth endowment: wealthy economies should ask for a minimum tax payment from all taxpayers; poor economies should only rely on income taxation, and allow taxpayers to be able to get away with their tax obligations. Minimum taxation, therefore, is like a luxury good and only rich economies can afford it. Copyright Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Maurizio Caserta & Francesco Reito, 2015. "Minimum taxation as a luxury good," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 32(3), pages 301-310, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:epolit:v:32:y:2015:i:3:p:301-310
    DOI: 10.1007/s40888-015-0015-x
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax evasion; Minimum tax; Moral hazard; D81; L14; O12;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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