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Introduction to the special issue: Public Procurement—new theoretical and empirical developments

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  • Stéphane Saussier

    (Institut d’Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne))

  • Paola Valbonesi

    (Universita’ di Padova
    Higher School of Economics - National Research University)

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  • Stéphane Saussier & Paola Valbonesi, 2018. "Introduction to the special issue: Public Procurement—new theoretical and empirical developments," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 45(1), pages 1-4, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:epolin:v:45:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s40812-018-0091-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s40812-018-0091-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pablo T. Spiller, 2009. "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard & Michel Ghertman (ed.), Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2012. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts," NBER Working Papers 18636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Spiller, Pablo T., 2013. "Transaction cost regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 232-242.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    5. Dimitri,Nicola & Piga,Gustavo & Spagnolo,Giancarlo (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Procurement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870733.
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    Cited by:

    1. Donghun Yoon, 2023. "The Improvement Policy Design of Public Procurement Process for the Public Management Innovation in South Korea," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(1), pages 21582440231, March.

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