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The Development Of Trust And Implications For Organizational Design: A Game- And Attribution-Theoretical Framework

  • Peter Eberl
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    Trust has been one of the central topics in organization research for the last years. Although the positive economic effects on the existence of trust relationships are relatively indisputable, the consequences for organizational design remain unclear. Against this background, the paper explores the conditions of trust development by using game and attribution theory in order to derive implications for organizational design. I argue that trust is based on emotional bonding and thus cannot be fully controlled by organizational measures. Rather, organizational structure can provide a context that fosters closer relationships. ue of this tax benefit. Finally, we derive a weighted average cost of capital that considers the deductibility of imputed equity interest. We show that an additional term correcting for equity tax shields is necessary.

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    Article provided by LMU Munich School of Management in its journal Schmalenbach Business Review.

    Volume (Year): 56 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 3 (July)
    Pages: 258–273

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    Handle: RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:56:y:2004:i:3:p:258-273
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