IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

The Prisoner's Dilemma and Regime-Switching in the Greek-Turkish Arms Race

Listed author(s):
  • Ron Smith

    (School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck College)

  • Martin Sola

    (School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck College and Department of Economics, Universidad Torcuata di Tella)

  • Fabio Spagnolo

    (School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck College)

Despite intensive investigation, little evidence has been found for a traditional Richardson-style arms race between Greece and Turkey using regression methods. This article uses an alternative model of the arms race, which treats it as a simple repeated two-by-two game such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which each country can choose a high or low share of military expenditure. This gives four possible states: both high; Greece high Turkey low; Turkey high Greece low; both low. The strategies of each country, the choice probabilities given the current state, are then estimated using a discrete state regime-switching model, which estimates the transition probabilities between the four states. Various hypotheses about these strategies are tested as restrictions on these transition probabilities. One set of hypotheses is that the countries play `tit-for-tat', doing what their opponent did in the previous period. This is rejected for both countries. Another hypothesis is that each country plays independently. Each country has its own probabilities of switching between high and low, which do not depend on whether the other country is high or low. This hypothesis is accepted by the data. The estimates of the transition probabilities suggest that the states, high or low shares of military expenditure, are very persistent, with very high probabilities of staying in them. The estimates are not consistent with a traditional `external' action-reaction explanation of shares of military expenditure, but are more consistent with `internal' explanations which emphasize bureaucratic and political inertia.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/37/6/737.abstract
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Peace Research Institute Oslo in its journal Journal of Peace Research.

Volume (Year): 37 (2000)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 737-750

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:37:y:2000:i:6:p:737-750
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.prio.no/

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:37:y:2000:i:6:p:737-750. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.