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The Conceptual Bases of The War Trap

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  • Michael Nicholson

    (International Studies Unit in London, University of Salford)

Abstract

This article attempts to evaluate the claims of Bruce Bueno De Mesquita in The War Trap to have provided a deductive, expected utility theory of war initiation in the light of various criticisms that have been levied against him. The criticisms concern both the status of the model as a rational choice model and the evidence adduced in its support. It is suggested that the interpretation of the concept used in the theory as expected utility is both unnecessary and misleading, while the strong claim of the theory to provide necessary conditions for war initiation is refuted, not confirmed, by the evidence presented. However, a weaker, but still important claim may well be true, though only a part of the evidence presented is appropriate to support it. The assertion that the theory is a step forward in a Lakatosian Research Program, in that it explains more than its predecessors, is viewed skeptically.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Nicholson, 1987. "The Conceptual Bases of The War Trap," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 346-369, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:2:p:346-369
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002787031002007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 1983. "The Costs of War: A Rational Expectations Approach," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 347-357, June.
    2. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 1985. "The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 156-177, March.
    3. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 1980. "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 917-931, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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