IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v15y1971i1p109-111.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Dollar Auction game: a paradox in noncooperative behavior and escalation

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Shubik

    (Department of Administrative Sciences, Yale University)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Shubik, 1971. "The Dollar Auction game: a paradox in noncooperative behavior and escalation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 15(1), pages 109-111, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:15:y:1971:i:1:p:109-111
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277101500111
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200277101500111
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/002200277101500111?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Migheli, Matteo, 2012. "It is not just escalation: The one dollar game revisited," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 434-438.
    2. Mark Broom & Jan Rychtář, 2018. "Evolutionary Games with Sequential Decisions and Dollar Auctions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 211-231, June.
    3. Andrea Morone & Simone Nuzzo & Rocco Caferra, 2019. "The Dollar Auction Game: A Laboratory Comparison Between Individuals and Groups," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 79-98, February.
    4. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2008. "The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible," Working Papers 2072/13264, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    5. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2016. "Penny auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 59-87.
    6. Matteo Migheli, 2017. "The winner’s curse in auctions with losses," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 16(1), pages 113-126, November.
    7. Delbono, Flavio & Lambertini, Luca, 2018. "Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 10-15.
    8. Pavlović, Dušan & Arandarenko, Mihail, 2011. "Serbia: equity and efficiency – hand-in-hand," SEER Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 14(2), pages 169-184.
    9. repec:cup:judgdm:v:11:y:2016:i:4:p:391-400 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Zhongmin Wang & Minbo Xu, 2016. "Empirical Evidence on Competition and Revenue in an All-Pay Contest," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(3), pages 429-448, November.
    11. A. Madureira & F. Hartog & N. Baken, 2016. "A holonic framework to understand and apply information processes in evolutionary economics: survey and proposal," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 157-190, September.
    12. Wang, Zhongmin & Xu, Minbo, 2016. "Selling a dollar for more than a dollar? Evidence from online penny auctions," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 53-68.
    13. Pierre Lescanne, 2013. "A simple case of rationality of escalation," Post-Print ensl-00832490, HAL.
    14. Pradeep, Siddhartha, 2019. "Game theory, Strategies and the convoluted triangle - India, Pakistan, Kashmir," EconStor Preprints 195929, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    15. Kolpin, Van, 2014. "Endogenous convention, prejudice, and trust in demographic summary games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 128-133.
    16. Bernhardt, Martin & Spann, Martin, 2010. "An Empirical Analysis of Bidding Fees in Name-your-own-price Auctions," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 283-296.
    17. Justin S. Skillman & Michael J. Vernarelli, 2016. "Framing effects on bidding behavior in experimental first-price sealed-bid money auctions," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 11(4), pages 391-400, July.
    18. Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, 1994. "Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 117-131, Spring.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:15:y:1971:i:1:p:109-111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.