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Die Rolle von Betriebsraeten und Gewerkschaften bei Senioritaetsentlohnung (Seniority Wages and the Role of Works Councils and Unions)

  • Thomas Zwick

Weshalb bezahlen Arbeitgeber Loehne, die mit der Betriebszugehoerigkeit steigen? Die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie betont, dass Arbeitgeber ihre Beschaeftigten an sich binden und motivieren wollen, indem sie ihnen einen relativ niedrigen Einstiegslohn sowie im Laufe der Betriebszugehoerigkeit staerker steigende Loehne bezahlen, als dies deren steigende Produktivitaet rechtfertigen wuerde. Dieser Beitrag versucht die empirische Relevanz der Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie zu testen und geht hierbei insbesondere auf die Rolle von Betriebsraeten und Gewerkschaften ein. Er bestaetigt die theoretischen Vorhersagen, die positive Einflussmoeglichkeiten beider Institutionen, nahelegen. (Why do employers pay seniority wages? The principal-agent theory stresses that employers might want to keep and motivate their employees by paying them a low entry wage and wage increases with tenure, although this may not be justified by their productivity development. This contribution tests the empirical relevance of this seniority wage interpretation. Hereby, it focuses on the role of works councils and unions. The theoretical hypotheses predicting a positive impact of both institutions on seniority wages are confirmed.)

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Article provided by Rainer Hampp Verlag in its journal Industrielle Beziehungen.

Volume (Year): 18 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1-2 ()
Pages: 119-131

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Handle: RePEc:rai:indbez:doi_10.1688/1862-0035_indb_2011_01-02_zwick
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