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Taux d'intérêt, rationnement du crédit et déséquilibres macroéconomiques

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  • Jean-Marc Tallon

Abstract

[fre] Cet article propose un modèle du comportement bancaire expliquant pourquoi, dans certains cas, la banque a intérêt à rationner le crédit qu'elle distribue, en laissant inchangé le taux d'intérêt plutôt que d'augmenter ce taux. Ce rationnement, provenant de la particularité du contrat de crédit, est expliqué sans avoir recours à l'hypothèse d'information asymétrique entre le prêteur et l'emprunteur. Les conclusions résistent assez bien. à l'introduction dans le modèle d'un marché financier et d'une certaine forme de concurrence bancaire. Le modèle permet également d'étudier les principales implications d'une variation du taux du marché monétaire. Une seconde partie présente les répercussions macroéconomiques du rationnement du crédit à la suite d'une hausse du taux du marché monétaire. Le mécanisme essentiel de propagation du « déséquilibre financier » vers la sphère réelle est la faillite d'entreprise et la baisse de l'offre de biens qui s'ensuit, due au non respect des contrats de vente, faute du crédit nécessaire pour les honorer. Cette propagation peut cependant être enrayée grâce à une politique économique appropriée, mais délicate à mener. Une troisième partie confronte aux faits les discussions théoriques. La mise en perspective de la récession américaine du début des années quatre-vingt et de la stagflation française fait apparaître l'importance, comme facteur dépressif, de la baisse du crédit distribué aux entreprises et donc, le caractère malsain pour l'économie mondiale d'une situation où les taux d'intérêt réels demeurent excessivement élevés. [eng] Credit Rationing, Interest Rates and Economic Activity Jean-Marc Talion This paper presents a model of banking behaviour to show why, in some cases, banks prefer to ration credit to their customers, rather than to increase the interest rate they charge. This rationing, which is due to the specificity of the credit contract, is modeled without any assumption of informational asymetry between the lender and the borrower. Our conclusions are fairly robust with respect to the introduction of financial markets into the model, as well as to that of some kind of competition amongst banks. Our model also allows us to study the major implications of a change in the money-market rate. In the second section, we discuss the macroeconomic consequences of credit rationing, in the case of a money-market rate increase. The fundamental transmission mechanism from the « financial disequilibrium » to real economic activity is firms' bankruptcy — and the resulting reduction in the supply of goods — due to sales contracts not being fulfilled when credit is insufficient. This effect may be avoided through an appropriate economic policy, but this would however have to be carefully carried out. The theoretical apparatus is then put to use with some empirical data. Our reading of the US recession in the early 1980s and of the French stagflation during the same period emphasizes the role of shrinking credit to business firms in these two recession episodes ; it shows the perverse character of excessively high real interest rates in the world economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Marc Tallon, 1988. "Taux d'intérêt, rationnement du crédit et déséquilibres macroéconomiques," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 24(1), pages 125-161.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1988_num_24_1_1147
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1988.1147
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tobin, James, 1982. " The Commercial Banking Firm: A Simple Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 84(4), pages 495-530.
    2. Blinder, Alan S, 1987. "Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failures," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(386), pages 327-352, June.
    3. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    4. Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January.
    5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 912-927, December.
    6. King, Stephen R, 1986. "Monetary Transmission: Through Bank Loans or Bank Liabilities?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(3), pages 290-303, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Guillard, 1992. "Déséquilibres macro-économiques et rationnement du crédit," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(6), pages 1071-1105.

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