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Les nouveaux instruments de politique commerciale

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  • Sylvie Javelot
  • Jean-Marc Siröen

Abstract

[fre] Les nouveaux instruments de politique commerciale. . L'objet de cette contribution est d'analyser les nouveaux instruments de la politique commerciale qui sont actuellement à l'origine de la plupart des conflits commerciaux. Ces instruments sont de nature unilatérale (droits antidumping, droits compensateurs, section 301,...) ou bilatérale (accords d'autolimitation ou d'importation) et échappent, pour la plupart, au cadre multilatéral du GATT. L'usage plus systématique de ces instruments, dont la légitimité économique est discutable, a contribué à dégrader le climat des relations commerciales internationales. Les résultats de l'Uruguay Round ne suffiront pas à contrecarrer cette évolution. [eng] The new instruments of trade policies. . The object of this article is to analyze the new instruments of trade policies that are currently behind the trade conflicts. These instruments are of unilateral nature (antidumping or countervailing duties, section 301) or bilateral nature (voluntary exports restraints, commitments of vouluntary imports). They escape multilateral rules of the GATT. The more systematic usage of these instruments, whose economie legitimacy is debatable, has contributed to degrade the climate of international economie relationships. Results of the Uruguay Round will not suffice for countering mis evolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvie Javelot & Jean-Marc Siröen, 1994. "Les nouveaux instruments de politique commerciale," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 487-500.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1994_num_45_3_409540
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    1. Dixit, Avinash, 1988. "Anti-dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 55-68, January.
    2. Michel Kostecki, 1987. "Export-restraint Arrangements and Trade Liberalization," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 425-453, December.
    3. Richard Harris, 1985. "Why Voluntary Export Restraints Are 'Voluntary.'," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(4), pages 799-809, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mustapha Sadni Jallab & Monnet Benoît Patrick Gbakou & René Sandretto, 2008. "L'influence des facteurs macroéconomiques sur les ouvertures d'enquêtes antidumping : le cas de l'Union Européenne et des États-Unis," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(4), pages 573-600.
    2. Enrico Colombatto, 2000. "An Explanation of the Dynamics of Protectionism," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 279-293, July.
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