The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers : An Efficiency Hypothesis of their Relation with Suppliers
[fre] Le papier explore l'hypothèse que les grands distributeurs, comme Wal Mart et Carrefour, jouent un rôle quasi-judiciaire dans leurs relations avec leurs fournisseurs, en adaptant les termes de leurs échanges aux changements qui surviennent et en sanctionnant les défaillances. Les abus potentiels de cette position sont limités par le besoin qu 'ont les distributeurs de re-contracter et de préserver leurs réputations. Les fournisseurs renouvellent leur confiance dans leurs distributeurs sur une base annuelle en rédigeant de nouveaux contrats. Ce renouvellement des contrats contredit l'hypothèse que les fournisseurs sont expropriés par les grands distributeurs en raison de l'existence d'investissements spécifiques. [eng] The paper explores the hypothesis that large retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, play a quasi-judicial role in their relationships with suppliers, adjusting the terms of trade to on-going changes and sanctioning performance failures. Potential abuse of their position is limited by the need for re-contracting and preserving their reputations. Suppliers renew their confidence in their retailers on a yearly basis, through writing new contracts. This renovation challenges the assertion that suppliers are expropriated by large retailers as a consequence of specific investments.
Volume (Year): 92 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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