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Co-evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action with Signaling for a Quorum

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  • Jorge M Pacheco
  • Vítor V Vasconcelos
  • Francisco C Santos
  • Brian Skyrms

Abstract

Collective signaling for a quorum is found in a wide range of organisms that face collective action problems whose successful solution requires the participation of some quorum of the individuals present. These range from humans, to social insects, to bacteria. The mechanisms involved, the quorum required, and the size of the group may vary. Here we address the general question of the evolution of collective signaling at a high level of abstraction. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of a population engaging in a signaling N-person game theoretic model. Parameter settings allow for loners and cheaters, and for costly or costless signals. We find a rich dynamics, showing how natural selection, operating on a population of individuals endowed with the simplest strategies, is able to evolve a costly signaling system that allows individuals to respond appropriately to different states of Nature. Signaling robustly promotes cooperative collective action, in particular when coordinated action is most needed and difficult to achieve. Two different signaling systems may emerge depending on Nature’s most prevalent states.Author Summary: From humans to social insects and bacteria, decision-making is often influenced by some form of collective signaling, be it quorum, information exchange, pledges or announcements. Here we investigate how such signaling systems evolve when collective action entails a public good, and how meanings co-evolve with individual choices, given Nature’s most prevalent states. We find a rich scenario, showing how natural selection is able to evolve a costly quorum signaling system that allows individuals to coordinate their action so as to provide the appropriate response to different states of Nature. We show that signaling robustly and selectively promotes cooperative collective action when coordinated action is most needed. In light of our results, and despite the complexity that collective action relying on quorum signaling may entail, it is not so surprising how signaling is a ubiquitous property of the living world.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge M Pacheco & Vítor V Vasconcelos & Francisco C Santos & Brian Skyrms, 2015. "Co-evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action with Signaling for a Quorum," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(2), pages 1-12, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1004101
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Ran & Hu, Kaipeng & Du, Chunpeng & Geng, Yini & Shi, Lei, 2019. "Coveting neighbors’ wisdom promotes cooperation in structured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 202-205.
    2. Alexander G. Ginsberg & Feng Fu, 2018. "Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games with Stochastic Opting-Out," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-27, December.
    3. Fernando P Santos & Francisco C Santos & Jorge M Pacheco, 2016. "Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(1), pages 1-13, January.
    4. Te Wu & Long Wang & Feng Fu, 2017. "Coevolutionary dynamics of phenotypic diversity and contingent cooperation," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(1), pages 1-16, January.

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