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The Ultimatum Game and Gender Effect: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan

Author

Listed:
  • Shahid Razzaque

    (Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.)

Abstract

Laboratory experimentation was once considered impossible or irrelevant in economics. Recently, however, economic science has gone through a real ‘laboratory revolution’, and experimental economics is now a most lively subfield of the discipline. This study attempts to examine answers to questions of the changing behaviour of opposite sexes under conditions of both anonymity and knowledge of gender by playing the ultimatum game in Pakistan. It is observed that the behaviour of males and females in Pakistani society is quite different from that found in earlier studies. Insights from the previous experiments have already shown that normative economic theory had failed in its predictions of human behaviour. Currently, the ultimatum game is widely discussed in behavioural economic literature, and this paper will adjust the traditional ultimatum game into a new form wherein it will be tested in the country (Pakistan) with multidimensional behaviour of subjects. With regard to gender effect specifically, all previous studies came up with somewhat mixed results, since results do not always point in the same direction and it is rather early to draw far-reaching conclusions regarding the behavioural differences of men and women. More facts are required in order to move towards the development of a systematic theory. This work is a small attempt to investigate the changing behaviour of opposite sexes under different controlled conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Shahid Razzaque, 2009. "The Ultimatum Game and Gender Effect: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 48(1), pages 23-46.
  • Handle: RePEc:pid:journl:v:48:y:2009:i:1:p:23-46
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    File URL: http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/2009/Volume1/23-46.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Dittrich, Dennis A.V. & Büchner, Susanne & Kulesz, Micaela M., 2015. "Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 81-90.
    2. Theresa Thompson Chaudhry & Misha Saleem, 2011. "Norms of Cooperation, Trust, Altruism, and Fairness: Evidence from Lab Experiments on Pakistani Students," Lahore Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics, vol. 16(Special E), pages 347-375, September.
    3. Saima Naeem & Asad Zaman, 2014. "Gender and Ultimatum in Pakistan: Revisited," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 53(1), pages 1-14.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ultimatum Game; Human Sex Difference; Social Behaviour;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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