Exploiting Energy and Mineral Resources in Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Mongolia
Formerly centrally planned countries may be especially vulnerable to institutional degradation and revenue volatility as sources of a resource curse. This paper examines these issues through case studies of six former Soviet republics and Mongolia, focussing on the methods of involving foreign partners in exploration and exploitation of natural resources. Kazakhstan in the 1990s was a prime example of rent-seeking institutional degradation, but an exceptionally positive conjuncture in the 2000s triggered institutional and policy evolution, while Uzbekistan had less resource-rent-driven institutional degradation in the 1990s, but stagnated in the 2000s. Turkmenistan and Mongolia highlight the missed opportunities from not involving foreign partners, while Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic illustrate the less predictable outcomes following quick deals with foreign investors. Institutions matter, but the case studies suggest more complex relationships than revealed by simple correlations between indicators of institutional quality or of ownership patterns.
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Volume (Year): 53 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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