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Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries

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  • Katharina Pistor
  • Yoram Keinan
  • Jan Kleinheisterkamp
  • Mark D. West

Abstract

The pattern of legal change in countries that have their legal systems transplanted from abroad differs markedly from countries that develop their own systems, irrespective of the legal family from which their laws come. In "transplant" countries, law often stagnates for long periods of time; when change takes place, it tends to be radical, if not erratic. External models remain dominant even years after the law was transplanted. Although there is some evidence that transplant countries have engaged in comprehensive legal reforms in response to the pressures of globalization, it is still too early to judge whether these new changes can be taken as a sign that the legal systems in these countries have started a process of endogenous legal evolution. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Katharina Pistor & Yoram Keinan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, 2003. "Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 18(1), pages 89-112.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:wbrobs:v:18:y:2003:i:1:p:89-112
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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Morck & Lloyd Steier, 2005. "The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction," NBER Chapters,in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 1-64 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Brigitte Evelyne Granville & Carol Scott Leonard, 2006. "Do institutions matter for technological change in transition economies? The case of the Russia's 89 regions and republics," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 70, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    3. Attiya Y. Javid & Robina Iqbal, 2010. "Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Corporate Valuation, Ownership and Financing," PIDE-Working Papers 2010:57, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    4. Cassey Lee, 2007. "Legal Traditions and Competition Policy," Chapters,in: Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing Countries, chapter 4 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Arturo Bris & Neil Brisley, 2008. "A Theory of Optimal Expropriation, Mergers and Industry Competition," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2522, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jun 2009.
    6. Kudrna, Zdenek, 2007. "Banking reform in China: Driven by international standards and Chinese specifics," MPRA Paper 7320, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
    8. Aldashev, Gani & Chaara, Imane & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2012. "Using the law to change the custom," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 182-200.
    9. Brisley, Neil & Bris, Arturo & Cabolis, Christos, 2011. "A theory of optimal expropriation, mergers and industry competition," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 955-965, April.

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