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Managerial Rents vs. Shareholder Value in Delegated Portfolio Management: The Case of Closed-End Funds

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  • Youchang Wu
  • Russ Wermers
  • Josef Zechner

Abstract

We examine the dynamics of assets under management (AUM) and management fees at the portfolio manager level in the closed-end fund industry. We find that managers capitalize on good past performance and favorable investor perceptions about future performance, as reflected in fund premiums, through AUM expansions and fee increases. However, the penalties for poor performance or unfavorable investor perceptions are either insignificant, or substantially mitigated by manager tenure. Long tenure is generally associated with poor performance and high discounts. Our findings suggest substantial managerial power in capturing CEF rents. We also document significant diseconomies of scale at the manager level.Received December 2, 2013; accepted June 21, 2016 by Editor Laura Starks.

Suggested Citation

  • Youchang Wu & Russ Wermers & Josef Zechner, 2016. "Managerial Rents vs. Shareholder Value in Delegated Portfolio Management: The Case of Closed-End Funds," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3428-3470.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:29:y:2016:i:12:p:3428-3470.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhw065
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    Cited by:

    1. Cujean, Julien, 2020. "Idea sharing and the performance of mutual funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 88-119.
    2. Eisele, Alexander & Nefedova, Tamara & Parise, Gianpaolo & Peijnenburg, Kim, 2020. "Trading out of sight: An analysis of cross-trading in mutual fund families," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(2), pages 359-378.
    3. Korniotis, George & Bonaparte, Yosef & Kumar, Alok, 2020. "Income Risk and Stock Market Entry/Exit Decisions," CEPR Discussion Papers 15370, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Souther, Matthew E., 2018. "The effects of internal board networks: Evidence from closed-end funds," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 266-290.
    5. Kräussl, Roman & Pollet, Joshua M. & Stefanova, Denitsa, 2023. "Closed-end funds and discount control mechanisms," CFS Working Paper Series 707, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    6. Korteweg, Arthur & Sorensen, Morten, 2017. "Skill and luck in private equity performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 535-562.
    7. Richard Evans & Javier Gil‐Bazo & Marc Lipson, 2024. "Mutual fund performance and manager assets: The negative effect of outside holdings," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 3-29, March.
    8. Liang Ma, 2024. "What drives closed‐end fund discounts? Evidence from COVID‐19," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 119-143, March.
    9. Xu, Ruihui & Zhang, Xuliang & Gozgor, Giray & Lau, Chi Keung Marco & Yan, Cheng, 2023. "Investor flow-chasing and price–performance puzzle: Evidence from global infrastructure funds," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    10. Humphrey, Jacquelyn E. & Hunter, David & Hoang, Khoa & Wei, Wang Chun, 2020. "Managerial rents vs. shareholder value in closed-end funds: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    11. Fletcher, Jonathan, 2018. "An empirical examination of the diversification benefits of U.K. international equity closed-end funds," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 23-34.
    12. Robert W. Faff, 2019. "Adopting a Structured Abstract Design to More Effectively Catch Reader Attention: An Application of the Pitching Research® Framework," Capital Markets Review, Malaysian Finance Association, vol. 27(2), pages 1-13.
    13. Liu, Xin, 2021. "Diversification in lottery-like features and portfolio pricing discount: Evidence from closed-end funds," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-11.
    14. Kräussl, Roman & Pollet, Joshua & Stefanova, Denitsa, 2018. "Signaling or marketing? The role of discount control mechanisms in closed-end funds," CFS Working Paper Series 597, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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