IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/renvpo/v12y2018i2p284-303..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Distribution of Emissions Allowances and the Use of Auction Revenues in the European Union Emissions Trading System

Author

Listed:
  • Åsa Löfgren
  • Dallas Burtraw
  • Markus Wråke
  • Anna Malinovskaya

Abstract

The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) introduced emissions allowances as a new asset worth tens of billions of euros. This article examines how this asset value has entered the economy and been distributed among stakeholders and for various purposes. We show that the system design has evolved significantly with the broader use of auctioning, although there continues to be free allocation of allowances to industry to address emissions leakage. By 2017–2020, more than half of all allowances are intended for auction, but recent reforms will reduce allowances in circulation by delaying, and to some extent canceling, the issuance of some allowances slated for auction. To date, the low price path deviates from what economic theory would prescribe as an efficient path to long-term emissions reduction goals, posing an important challenge for the ETS and coordination of member states’ ambitions. Allowance prices are expected to rise due to recent reforms; however, technology support policies promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency tend to reduce allowance prices. Thus both auctioned quantities and prices remain uncertain. The use of auction revenue is left to EU member states, who have directed more than half of auction revenue to energy- and climate-related activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Åsa Löfgren & Dallas Burtraw & Markus Wråke & Anna Malinovskaya, 2018. "Distribution of Emissions Allowances and the Use of Auction Revenues in the European Union Emissions Trading System," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(2), pages 284-303.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:renvpo:v:12:y:2018:i:2:p:284-303.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/reep/rey012
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Aleksandar Zaklan, 2023. "Coase and Cap-and-Trade: Evidence on the Independence Property from the European Carbon Market," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 526-558, May.
    2. Burtraw, Dallas & Holt, Charles & Palmer, Karen & Shobe, William M., 2020. "Quantities with Prices: Price-Responsive Allowance Supply in Environmental Markets," RFF Working Paper Series 20-17, Resources for the Future.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:renvpo:v:12:y:2018:i:2:p:284-303.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aereeea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.