Progressive taxation and wage setting when unions strategically interact
In a multisector economy with unionized labor markets, the interdependence of union wage claims--typical of industrial bargaining--affects the relationship between tax progressivity and wage pressure, which varies in a nonlinear fashion with the nature of the wage bargain, and can be hump-shaped. Our empirical analysis of 20 OECD countries for the period 1997--2004 shows that higher tax progressivity increases pre-tax wages (and unemployment) in countries characterized by industry level wage bargaining, and reduces them in countries with local or fully centralized bargaining. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 59 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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